Multisite Terroristic attacks in Brussels (B): a challenge?

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NO conflict of interest to declare
I love Belgium 😊
The facts
112 is regulated by a Federal laws
Control of each area is Regionaly based
Call center are operated by Fireman
Hierarchy of Fireman = Ministry of interior affairs at Federal Level
Special status for Brussel (WashingtonDC)
Hierarchy of Hospital & Ambulance = Ministry of Public Health
In case of mass emergency

1. Medical Team H24 responsible for mass emergency management
2. On the field 20 min after incident
3. Take control of medical operation
4. Coordination with police and Fire Brigade
5. Emergency plan are based on Federal laws for the structure.
22 March 2016

- 7h58 am, 2 bombs in Brussels Airport
- 9h11 am, explosion in Tube, Maelbeek Station (near the EC)
- Maelbeek: 35 T1/T2, 35 T3
- Airport: 30 T1 / 21 T2 / 32 T3
- 2 management team, 2 call centers
- 10 Hospitals involved
Involved

**Airport**
- 1 Medical coordination Team
- 4 prehosp. Medical Team
- 10 ambulances
- 4 medical team from the airport

**Metro**
- 1 Medical coordination team
- 5 prehosp Medical Team
- 20 ambulances
Brussels daily Ressources

- 8 prehospital mobile medical team (1 nurse + 1 physician)
- 25 ambulances (3 with nurses)
- 11 Hospitals
Prepared?

Paris 13/11/2015

The medical response to multisite terrorist attacks in Paris

Martin Hirsch, Pierre Carli, Rémy Nizard, Bruno Riou, Baroury Baroudjian, Thierry Baubet, Vibol Chhor, Charlotte Chollet-Xemard, Nicolas Dantchev, Nadia Fleury, Jean-Paul Fontaine, Youri Yordanov, Maurice Raphael, Catherine Paugam Burtz, Antoine Lafont, on behalf of the health professionals of Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (APHP)

Lancet 2015; 386: 2535–38
Develop multi site scenario

- Ressources
  - Human
  - Medical stuffs
  - Psycho-support
- Evacuation
- Pre hospital care
- In hospital care

Regionaly based

Not extended to other Region
The Challenge

- Type of wound ➔ damage control
- Medical supplies
  - Morphine
  - Tourniquet
- Failure of communications
- Incertainty of security
- 2 calls center
- 2 on site coordination team
- Social Network
- 24 h of work
We do the job
We knows each other better than we think
Pre hospital team strong
In hospital team strong
Capacities to endorse multiple responsibilities
And if?

Total failure of communication

Needs of coordination
  • Inside medical discipline
  • with police – fire brigade

1 hospital forgotten

Best to care than to organize

Plans were not used (burned, multisite)
L'avant et l'après 22 mars vu par le coordinateur des secours à Maelbeek

ENTRETIEN DE LOUISE VANDERKELLEN  Publié le jeudi 22 septembre 2016 à 12h23 - Mis à jour le jeudi 22 septembre 2016 à 12h29
((terrorist[All Fields] AND attack[All Fields]) AND plan[All Fields]) AND preparedness[All Fields]

Terrorist+attack, n=849
Terrorist+attack+plan, n=46 (23 relevant)
Terrorist+attack+plan+preparedness, n=11
We do the job but we can’t say that it was predictable.

Plans are nothing without expert and manager on the field

What if in context of reduction of the ressources

Important need of research

Did we learned something?