



Multisite Terroristic attacks in Brussels (B): a challenge?

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


NO conflict of interest to declare




I love Belgium © The facts













- 112 is regulated by a Federal laws
- Control of each area is Regionaly based
- Call center are operated by Fireman
- Hierarchy of Fireman = Ministry of interior affairs at Federal Level
- Special status for Brussel (WashingtonDC)
- Hierarchy of Hospital & Ambulance = Ministry of Public Health



In case of mass emergency

- 1 Medical Team H24 responsible for mass emergency management
- On the field 20 min after incident
- Take control of medical operation
- Coordination with police and Fire Brigade
- Emergency plan are based on Federal laws for the structure.



22 March 2016

- 7h58 am, 2 bombs in Brussels Airport
- 9h11 am, explosion in Tube, Maelbeek Station (near the EC)
- Maelbeek: 35 T1/T2, 35 T3
- Airport: 30 T1 / 21 T2 / 32 T3
- 2 management team, 2 call centers
- 10 Hospitals involved
















Involved

<u>Airport</u>

- 1 Medical coordination Team
- 4 prehosp.
 Medical Team
- 10 ambulances
- 4 medical team from the airport


Metro

- 1 Medical coordination team
- 5 prehosp Medical Team
- 20 ambulances



Brussels daily Ressources

- 8 prehospital mobile medical team (1 nurse+1physician)
- 25 ambulances (3 with nurses)
- 11 Hospitals





Prepared?

Paris 13/11/2015

The medical response to multisite terrorist attacks in Paris



Martin Hirsch, Pierre Carli, Rémy Nizard, Bruno Riou, Barouyr Baroudjian, Thierry Baubet, Vibol Chhor, Charlotte Chollet-Xemard, Nicolas Dantchev, Nadia Fleury, Jean-Paul Fontaine, Youri Yordanov, Maurice Raphael, Catherine Paugam Burtz, Antoine Lafont, on behalf of the health professionals of Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (APHP)

Lancet 2015; 386: 2535-38



Develop multi site scenario

- Ressources
 - Human
 - Medical stuffs
 - Psycho-support
- Evacuation
- Pre hospital care
- In hospital care
- Regionaly based
- Not extended to other Region 20 november 2011



The Challenge

- Type of wound > damage control
- Medical supplies
 - Morphine
 - Tourniquet
- Failure of communications
- Incertainty of security
- 2 calls center
- 2 on site coordination team
- Social Network
- 24 h of work



« the glass half full »

- We do the job
- We knows each other better than we think
- Pre hospital team strong
- In hospital team strong
- Capacities to endorse multiple responsabilities



« the glass half empty »


- And if ?
- Total failure of communication
- Needs of coordination
 - Inside medical discipline
 - with police fire brigade
- 1 hospital forgoten
- Best to care than to organize 20 novembre 2016
- Plans were not used (burned, multisite)



be strong, be strong, be strong

L'avant et l'après 22 mars vu par le coordinateur des secours à Maelbeek

ENTRETIEN DE LOUISE VANDERKELEN Publié le jeudi 22 septembre 2016 à 12h23 - Mis à jour le jeudi 22 septembre 2016 à 12h29





Science?



((terrorist[All Fields] AND attack[All Fields])
AND plan[All Fields]) AND
preparedness[All Fields]

Terrorist+attack, n=849
Terrorist+attack+plan, n=46 (23 relevant)
Terrorist+attack+plan+preparedness, n=11



Conclusion

- We do the job but we can't say that it was predictable.
- Plans are nothing without expert and manager on the field
- What if in context of reduction of the ressources
- Important need of research 20 novembre
- Did we learned something?



